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INCREASING SCOPE OF SEARCH INCIDENTAL
TO ARREST
H. Frank Way, Jr.t
INTRODUCTION
One of the major problems in the law of search and seizure today
is the increasing scope of search incidental to arrest.1 This problem is
intimately connected with the decline in the use of warrants by law
enforcement officers. In part this decline can be attributed to the vast
urbanization and industrialization which has occurred in the United
States in the last seventy-five years. Searches and seizures by war-
rants are undoubtedly easier in a more rural society than is found in
the United States today. In the rural atmosphere of the United States
from the founding of our nation until the post-Civil War period the
absence of rapid means of communication and transportation did not
necessitate the speed of action which law enforcement officers believe
is demanded in the urban community. The result of this demand for
quick action has been a decline in the use of the warrant.
The decline in the warrant has intensified the problem of determin-
ing by a post-mortem the reasonable limits of search and seizure.
Without the prior statement of probable cause and the particular de-
scription of the places to be searched and the things to be seized, law
enforcement officers must use their own judgment of what constitutes
reasonable physical scope of the search and seizure. Allowing for a
certain area of disagreement which would be present whether a war-
rant were used or not, law enforcement officers have demonstrated a
tendency to push the limits of the physical scope of search and seizure
to the utmost.
PRINCIPLES OF REASONABLE SCOPE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The description in a search warrant of the place to be searched
places an initial limitation upon the physical scope of the search. A
certain minimal description is required in all warrants. However, the
degree of description required will depend upon the circumstances of
t Assistant Professor in Political Science, University of California.
1. By scope of search is meant the physical area which may be reasonably
searched as incidental to arrest.
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the case. The less description there is in the warrant, the more likely
it is that an officer will attempt to make as broad a search as he thinks
a court would allow in the event of any judicial review of his actions.
The problems in defining reasonable scope of search and seizure,
however, have not been primarily those of searches under warrants,
but rather have developed as searches incidental to an otherwise valid
arrest, with or without an arrest warrant. Indeed, there have been
few cases which have reached the federal appellate level where the
question of scope under a warrant has been involved. On the other
hand, the federal courts have been continually faced with the problem
in the last thirty-five years of defining the scope of incidental search.
Regardless of whether a warrant is used or not, the principles which
limit the scope of search and seizure should be the same. The follow-
ing appear to be some of the basic principles which have governed the
problem in the federal courts. The application of these principles in
specific cases has produced a broader scope than one might suspect
from a mere reading of the principles.
1. A search and seizure occurs only for that which offends the law.
(a) No search is. reasonable which is conducted merely to secure
evidence of a crime; hence general or exploratory searches aimed only
at the uncovering of mere evidence of a crime are unreasonable.
2. The search and seizure is to be no broader than the justifying
basis.
(a) The justifying basis for the initial action of the arrest or
search will be determined upon the basis of facts known prior to the
search or arrest and the nature of the crime.
(i) A search and seizure cannot be made reasonable by
what it uncovers, nor can the physical extent of the search be so justi-
fied.
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO ARREST
Historical Background of Incidental Search.
Before the development of the warrant in the law of search and
seizure, the English common law recognized the right to search a per-
son as incidental to an arrest. With the coming of formal process the
English law continued to recognize this right of incidental search as
well as the right of arrest without warrant under the limitations of
2. The general rule of description will be found in Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), and Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
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necessity.' American state cases in the nineteenth century followed
the English rules in this area., An examination of the early cases re-
veals that the principle of search incidental to a valid arrest had its
origin in the necessity of rendering the prisoner harmless and pre-
venting the destruction of goods otherwise subject to seizure. While
there is no complete agreement in this area, most of the early state
cases strictly limited the scope of the search to the body of the prisoner
and to goods which were subject to seizure and were visible to the
arresting officer.5 In no case was a search allowed to go beyond the
things actually in the possession of the prisoner. This was generally
construed to be the person of the prisoner, in other words, the "frisk"
as we know it today.
Particularly, the desire to disarm the prisoner brought about the en-
largement of the valid scope of the search. If the weapons of the pris-
oner were not actually on his body, the officer was allowed to extend
his incidental search so that such items might be seized. The very
ambiguity of the term "in possession" of the prisoner lent itself to this
enlargement6 An 1866 New York court decision on this point is a
fair representation of the general rule that prevailed in the latter part
of the nineteenth century. The court stated that an officer, acting
under an arrest warrant, had no authority "to search the house or
premises of the accused for concealed property. For this purpose an-
other process is necessary; but he may search the person of the alleged
thief, or take into custody the property, if in his possession, and
pointed out to him as that described in the process."7 This decision is
certainly a far cry from what we shall presently discern to be the
current federal rules on the extent of incidental search.
The Federal Rule of Search Incidental to Valid Arrest.
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search
3. Hale, Pleas of the Crown §§ 60-61; 1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law
of England 193 (1883); Note, Law of Arrest Without Warrant, I Albany L.J. 86
(1870) ; Note, Arrest Without Warrant-Offense in the Presence of the Officer,
36 Cent. L.J. 475 (1893).
4. E.g., Reifsynder v. Lee, 44 Iowa 101 (1876); Rohan v. Swain, 59 Mass.
(5 Cush.) 281 (1850); Houghton v. Bachman, 47 Barb. 388, 392 (N.Y. 1866);
Wakely v. Hart, 15 Pa. 295 (1814).
5. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Davis v. United States, .328 U.S. 582, 609
(1946) touches briefly upon the historical background of this problem.
6. See Ewbank, Extent of Right to Search and Bind Persons When Arrested,
56 Cent. L.J. 303 (1903).
7. Houghton v. Bachman, 47 Barb. 388, 392 (N.Y. 1866). See also United
States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318, 319 (2d Cir. 1911); Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H.
482 (1867).
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the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it
was committed as well as weapons and other things to effect an
escape from custody is not to be doubted.
Thus the Supreme Court firmly established the right of incidental
search in the Agnello decision of 1925.8 While the rule of the Agnello
case has been frequently relied upon in federal courts, there has been
a basic misunderstanding about the rule which has contributed in no
small degree to the extension of the physical scope of search at the
time of arrest.
The facts of the Agnelo decision as well as the language of the Court
seem to indicate that the Court intended that the rule be limited to
cases of arrest for a crime committed in the presence of the arresting
officer. Later federal decisions ignored any relationship between the
scope of incidental search and whether the arrest was under warrant
or without a warrant for a crime committed in the presence of the
officer, or in still another category, for a crime in which the officer had
probable cause to believe that a felony had been or was being com-
mitted.
The important thing about an arrest for a crime being committed
in the presence of the officer is that there is necessity for dispensing
with the warrant so that the officer can immediately seize the person
committing the crime and make a thorough search of the prisoner in
order to render him harmless. When the officer actually sees a crime
being committed in his presence, there is little speculation as to prob-
able cause for the arrest. There is little likelihood that the prisoner's
privacy will be unreasonably invaded if the arrest occurs at a place
where the officer is lawfully present. In the instances where the arrest
is by.warrant, the magistrate has been presented with the probable
causeand limits the arrest thereby. In the unusual circumstances
wherd'an officer does not see a crime being committed, has no time to
apply for a warrant, but has probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed or is being committed, the chances are far greater that
an unreasonable invasion of privacy will occur. Historically these un-
usual circumstances were limited to grave crimes against the public
safety and not just to any felony under the laws of the United States.
The cause for such arrests was the immediate protection of public
safety and not the mere detection of crime.
In Carroll v. United States,9 the first Supreme Court decision to
elaborate on search without a warrant, the element of necessity for
prompt action was a central point in dispensing with the warrant.
There the Court found that the mobility of the automobile necessitated
8. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
9. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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the quick action by officers, even to the extent of foregoing formal
process. However, the Court stated that "in cases where the securing
of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used. . . ."0 In the
Agnello decision, which was handed down in 1925, the same year as
the Carroll case, the Court followed the requirement of necessity for
immediate action; that is, where it was not reasonably practical to
attempt to secure process, the search without a warrant would not
necessarily be unreasonable. Again, in 1931, the Court noted in ruling
against the search in the Go-Bart" case that the officer had had ample
time to secure a warrant and had failed to do so.
The question of necessity in searches without a warrant is men-
tioned here in order that the reader may watch the widening scope of
search in the absence of necessity in cases after 1948. In the cases
below, a short outline will be made of the development of this problem
from 1925 through 195&12
Incidental Search Does Not Extend Beyond the Place of Arrest.
The first Supreme Court decision to give any indication of the rea-
sonable extent of incidental search was the decision in Weeks v. United
States." In this case Weeks had been arrested at the Union Station in
Kansas City, Missouri. While Weeks was being arrested, other officers
went to his residence some distance from the place of arrest and con-
ducted a search of his home without a warrant. The Court held this
latter conduct to be unreasonable and not justifiable on the basis of
the arrest. The Court did say that an incidental search could be made
at the time of arrest for fruits of the crime found at such time and
within the control of the prisoner2" It is obvious from the decision
that the Court would not allow Weeks' residence to come within the
phrase "the control of the prisoner." Beyond this the Court gave no
indication of what it considered to be the limitations of this phrase.
There is no indication in the Weeks case that the government at-
tempted to justify the arbitrary invasion of Weeks' residence without
a warrant as incidental to the arrest at the Union Statio-... Such an
attempt would have made a mockery of the privacy of one's home as
protected by the fourth amendment. In 1925, in Agnello v. United
States' federal agents did make such a bold attempt. The agents wit-
nessed the consummation of an illegal sale of narcotic drugs by looking
10. Id. at 156.
11. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931).
12. The outline will follow major topics within the chronological development
of the topics.
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. Id. at 392
15. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
Washington University Open Scholarship
266 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
through a window in the home of one Alba. The agents entered the
home, arrested the defendants and seized the packages of cocaine
as well as the money used in the sale. At this point the agents left
Alba's residence and went to the home of one of the other persons
arrested and searched it without a warrant. Upon finding no narcotic
drugs the agents then went several blocks further to the home of
Agnello, one of those arrested, and entered it without a warrant. In
the meantime the prisoners had all been taken to police headquarters.
The Court upheld the arrest and incidental search and seizure made at
the place of arrest, that is, at the home of AlbVa. The other searches
and seizures were held to be in violation of the fourth amendment. The
Court pointed out that it was not to be doubted that officers had a
right to search persons lawfully arrested while committing a crime
in order to seize weapons, or instruments and fruits of the crime.'
Such an incidental search does not extend, however, beyond the place
of the arrest and the Court reminded the government that except as
incident to a valid arrest there is no sanction for the government to
search a private dwelling house without a warrant. In noting that
officers had an incidental right of search at the place of the arrest, the
Court commented that "the right does not extend to other places.
Frank Agnello's house was several blocks distant from Alba's house,
where the arrest was made. When it was entered and searched, the
conspiracy was ended and the defendants were under arrest and in
custody elsewhere." 7
Incidental Search and Third Parties.
On at least one occasion the Supreme Court has indicated that the
right of incidental search does not extend to third parties. In United
State v. Di Re"' an informer told the police he was to purchase counter-
feit gasoline ration coupons from a certain person at a designated
time and place. When the officers appeared they found its owner, from
whom the informer had just purchased the coupons, sitting in the auto-
mobile with a third party, Di Re. The owner of the car and Di Re were
arrested without a warrant Di Re accompanied the officers to the
police station without protest. A search of his person revealed an
envelope containing counterfeit coupons. The Government contended
that the search of Di Re was justified as incident to the search of a car
reasonably believed to be carrying contraband, or as incident to the
16. Id. at 30. See the recent case of Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1958), where the Court upheld an arrest without a warrant and the incidental
search in a case where the officer did not see a crime being committed in his
presence but merely had probable cause to believe that one was being committed.
17. Id. at 30-31.
18. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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lawful arrest. The Court held that an otherwise valid incidental search
did not carry with it the right to search a third party even if the de-
sired article, because of its smallness, could be easily concealed. To
allow such would mean that the officers could search guests in a home
as an incident to the search of the house, a position which even the
government did not contend for. As to the government contention that
the search was justified as an incident to the lawful arrest of Di Re,
the Court stated that this position could not be accepted since the
initial arrest was invalid. As the officers arrested in the state of New
York, federal law required them to conform to the mode of process for
that state.1 9 The arrest was for a misdemeanor and the New York
law, like that in many other jurisdictions, stipulates that arrest for a
misdemeanor without a warrant must be for a crime committed in the
presence of the officer. Yet Di Re committed no offense in the presence
of the arresting officers. To have made a valid arrest the officers must
have had probable cause, and the necessary probable cause could not be
inferred simply by the proximity of Di Re to the occasion of a crime
or from his submissiveness in the face of arrest.
The Di Re decision seems to have been a wise one. There could be
many instances where an individual would be fortuitously placed in
physical proximity to the commission of a crime. In the absence of any
probable cause which would connect the individual to the crime, the
police should not be allowed to extend their incidental searches to by-
standers.or even those intimately associated with the person arrested.
The immediate intimate contact does not of necessity mean the indi-
vidual is a party to the crime.
Extent of Incidental Search at the Place of Arrest.
Two years after the Agnello decision the Supreme Court had occa-
sion to rule upon the extent of search at the place of arrest. In Marron
v. United States"- prohibition agents obtained a search warrant for
the search and seizure of intoxicating liquors and articles for their
manufacture. Upon arriving at the described place, the agents found
that liquor was being sold on the premises by the drink. In view of
the crime being committed in their presence, the agents arrested the
attendant in charge and proceeded to search the premises. They seized
articles other than those described in the search warrant and justified
this as a search and seizure incidental to the execution of a search
warrant. The Court rejected the contention that the execution of a
search warrant allows an incidental search and seizure. However, the
Court allowed th6 search and soizure as incidental to the arrest for a
19. 1 Stat. 91 (1789).
20. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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crime committed in the presence of the officers. It is important to note
that the search went beyond the confines of the barroom in which the
arrest was made and extended to a closet. In the closet the officers
found a ledger which they seized as an instrument of the crime. Addi-
tionally it is important to note that the Court, as in the Agnello case,
held that the search of the place was dependent upon the fact that
there had been an arrest for a crime committed in the presence of the
officers.
The implications of the Marron case could have gone a long way to-
ward circumventing the protection against general searches. However,
in 1931, the Supreme Court handed down a decision which was to take
some of the sting out of the Marron case. In Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States2l an arrest warrant had been issued upon complaint of a
conspiracy to violate the prohibition act by the purchase of an auto-
mobile. The officers, upon entering the office of the defendants, ar-
rested them and made an incidental search and seizure of the persons
arrested. The officers then conducted a search of the three rooms
where the arrest was made, forcibly entering locked drawers and
seizing papers therefrom. In examining the search, the Court stated
that "there is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.
Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. It is not,
and could not be, claimed that the officers saw conspiracy being com-
mitted."22 Nor could the officers have claimed that there was a crime
being committed in their presence. Secondly, the Court remarked that
there had been ample time for securing a search warrant. Finally, the
Court attempted to distinguish the Marron case, holding that in the
Marron case the seizures were of visible and accessible articles and
that there was no threat, as in the instant case, of general ransacking.
The Court ignored the reported fact in the Marron case that the ledger
seized was not visible from the place of arrest but found upon search
of the closet of the barroom. There seems to be little doubt, however,
that Justice Butler, who wrote the opinions in both of these cases, in-
tended to limit the Marron case.
One year after the Go-Bart case Justice Butler again wrote the
Court's opinion for a case which veered away from the Marron de-
cision. In United States v. Lefkowit 23 officers, acting under an arrest
warrant, proceeded to a specified room in a New York City office build-
ing. Upon entry they found Lefkowitz, designated in the warrant as
Henry Miller, and arrested him. The room was divided by a partition
and the officers searched both areas of the room as well as the person
of the defendant. They opened drawers, cabinets, and seized various
21. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
22. Id. at 357.
23. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
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articles. The Court held this to be an unreasonable search and seizure.
The decision pointed out that the complaint upon which the warrant
of arrest was issued was conspiracy to solicit in a wholesale business,
intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. There
was no complaint that the defendants were engaged in openly running
a bar. There was no bar and there was no crime committed in the
presence of the officers. As in the previous cases, the Court stated
that the government could not justify the search beyond the person as
reasonable on the basis of a crime being committed in the presence of
the officers. "Save as given by that warrant and as lawfully incident
to its execution, the officers had no authority over respondents or any-
thing in the room. The disclosed circumstances clearly show that the
prohibition agents assumed the right contemporaneously with the ar-
rest to search out and scrutinize everything in the rooms in order
to ascertain whether the books, papers,... contained or constituted
evidence of respondents' guilt of crime, whether that specified in the
warrant or some other offense under the Act.' 2 4 The Court pointed out
that the authority to search under an arrest warrant is certainly no
greater than that under a search warrant. Upon the basis of the prob-
able cause that the officers had for the particular crime, no search war-
rant could have been validly issued which would have conferred the
authority that they assumed under the arrest warrant. That is to say,
the Court felt that as there was insufficient probable cause for a search
warrant, the officers could not assume greater authority under an ar-
rest warrant than the initial probable cause justified. The Court again
warned that security against unlawful searches is best protected by
resort to search warrants.2 5
It is quite clear that by the time of the Lefkowitz case, incidental
search of the premises or place of arrest, as distinguished from the
person of the prisoner, was to be limited to those cases where the ar-
rest was for a crime committed in the presence of the officer.28 All of
the Supreme Court cases which had allowed incidental search beyond
the person as reasonable were cases in which a crime was being com-
mitted in the presence of the officer. It is true that the Court nevei
stated before 1947 whether or not other types of arrest carried with
them the right of incidental search beyond the person of the prisoner.
In other words, prior to 1947, the only affirmative statements of in-
cidental search beyond the person of the prisoner had been limited to
arrests for crimes committed in the presence of officers. The failure
of the Court to make any affirmative statements of the right existing
24. Id. at 463-64.
25. Id. at 464.
26. See Lasson, History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 128 (1937).
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in other types of arrest does not necessarily preclude the existence of
the right. However, these cases are a strong indication that the Court
did not intend that arrest supersede the requirements of the fourth
amendment for the reasonable invasion of privacy by the use of search
warrants.
2
Control or Possession of the Place of Arrest: Broader Scope in
the Lower Federal Courts.
Prior to the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases the lower federal courts
were allowing a much broader scope to incidental search than any
previous Supreme Court decision had supported. In Sayers v. United
States-3 officers discovered that the defendant was using the kitchen
of her apartment as a place for the illegal sale of liquor. The kitchen
was being used as a business establishment open to the public. The
officers went there and purchased liquor from the defendant and after
the commission bf the crime the officers arrested her. After the arrest
the officers searched the entire premises, including private rooms
across the hall from the place of arrest. The court held this incidental
search to be reasonable and announced a doctrine hitherto completely
unsupported by any Supreme Court decision. The lower court stated
that an incidental search might go "to the extent that the offender's
control and activities likely extended." 2 The court even noted that the
search beyond the person might extend to every room of a building.30
In the year following the Sayers case another federal court carried
this doctrine to the extreme. In United States v. Charles31 the court
held as valid the search of a hotel proprietor's living quarters after the
arrest had been made in the hotel lobby. As in the Sayers case the
arrest was for a crime committed in the presence of the officers. An-
other case illustrative of this doctrine is Dibello v. United States.32
Here the court allowed an incidental search of the basement of a soft
drink establishment after an arrest on the main floor. Again, the ar-
rest was for a crime committed in the presence of the officers.
27. In United States v. Lester, 21 F.R.D. 376 (W.D. Pa. 1957) the district
court did stress the difference between incidental search under a warrant and
incidental search at arrest for a crime committed in the presence of the officer
and cited the Marron case on this point. See also the same point in Henderson v.
United States, 206 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1953).
28. 2 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1924).
29. Id. at 147.
30. Cf. United States v. Seltzer, 5 F.2d 364 (Mass. 1925), where a broad in-
cidental search was allowed upon commission of a crime in the presence of the
officers. Here, however, at least part of the broad scope can be attributed to the
defendant's waiver of protection of areas at the place of arrest.
31. 8 F.2d 302 (N.D. Cal. 1925).
32. 19 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1927).
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In contrast to the above decisions is the opinion of Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt.33 This case was somewhat
different as there was a search warrant as well as a search incidental
to an arrest. However, it is significant that the court treated as in-
separable the two different authorities for search. After the arrest
was made in Kirschenblatt's office, a general search of the premises
was made and a small quantity of liquor and a number of papers were
seized. Judge Hand held that the scope of the incidental search was
dependent upon the authority for the arrest. The arrest was based
upon a violation of the National Prohibition Act. Under the particular
provision of this act the search and seizure was to be limited to con-
tainers and property for the manufacture of illegal liquor. The search
could not extend to the seizure of private papers. "[S] trict consistency
might give to a search of the premises, incidental to arrest, the same
scope as to a search of person, [yet] it seems to us that that result
would admit exactly the evils against which the Fourth Amendment is
directed. . .. [I]t is . . . a totally different thing to search a man's
pockets and use against him what they contain, from ransacking his
house for everything which may incriminate him. ... "3
The Kirschenblatt decision was to be cited in later Supreme Court
decisions and along with the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases narrowed
the permissible area of incidental search. However, a number of years
after these cases the Supreme Court handed down a decision which
went a long way towards giving approval to the nearly unlimited in-
cidental search of the Sayers doctrine.
Expansion of Incidental Search.
1. The Harris Decision, 1947.
In 1947, the Supreme Court made the biggest step backward in the
protection of privacy in the nearly 160 years of its history. Reference
is made to the decision of the Court in United States v. Haris.35
In this case agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, acting
under an arrest warrant, went to the apartment of Harris and arrested
him on charges of fraud and forgery. The officers stated they were
looking for specific cancelled checks alleged to have been used for
forgery purposes and which they believed were in the possession of
Harris. It is important to note that the government openly acknowl-
edged that the incidental search was directed to articles about which
they had a considerable amount of prior knowledge. The search for
these checks covered the entire four-room apartment and lasted five
33. 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926).
34. Id. at 202.
35. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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hours. In the course of this highly detailed search one of the officers
found in a dresser drawer a sealed envelope marked "George Harris,
Personal Papers." The officer opened the envelope and found eight
Selective Service N4ice of Classification cards and Registration Cer-
ticates. Although unconnected with the cause of arrest, these papers
were seized as unlawfully in the possession of Harris and were used
against Harris in a prosecution for violation of the draft laws.
In a five-to-four decision, Chief Justice Vinson held for the majority
that the five-hour four-room search was reasonable as incidental to the
arrest; this in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court had never
previously allowed an incidental search beyond the pelson under an
arrest warrant. In fact the majority gave no indication that they were
aware of the nature of the arrests in the previous cases on incidental
search.
The majority focused attention on the fact that the checks were of
such small size that a thorough search was necessary. They felt that
since the checks could have been hidden in various secluded spots in
the apartment, an extensive and intensive search was demanded.
The Chief Justice did observe, however, that "other situations may
arise in which the nature and size of the object sought or the lack of
effective control over the premises on the part of the persons arrested
may require that the searches be less extensive."3 6 The Chief Justice
ignored the question of why the officers did not secure a search war-
rant for the checks if they had prior knowledge that the checks had
been stolen and were in the possession of the defendant. The failure
to apply for a search warrant can only lead to the conclusion of a
callous disregard for the requirements of the fourth amendment. The
only other conclusion is that the officers did not have prior knowledge
of the checks, in which case the incidental search was a general ex-
ploratory search in the hopes of securing evidence of the crime.
As to the~seizure of the draft cards, the Court held that since they
were properly subject to seizure as government property illegally in
the possession of the defendant and since they were discovered in the
course of an otherwise valid search made in good faith their seizure
was reasonable. If one can accept the assumption that the search was
otherwise valid, then the Court's conclusion here seems sound.
2. The Rabinowitz Decision, 1950.
The final Supreme Court case which is relevant to the question of
the scope of search is the decision in United States v. Rabinowitz.31
The case is interesting if for no other reason than the fact that it
36. Id. at 152.
37. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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overruled the recent Trupiano3s decision on the practicality of securing
a warrant. The Trupiano decision tended to make the factor of the
opportunity to secure a warrant the primary test of the reasonableness
of search and seizure.
In the present case Rabinowitz was arrested under a warrant charg-
ing him with selling and having in his possession forged and altered
government stamps. The arrest took place in his one-room office, an
office open to the public. As incidental to this arrest the officers
searched the desk, safe, and file cabinets and seized a number of forged
stamps which were introduced as evidence against him, over his timely
objection. The Supreme Court voted four to three to uphold the con-
viction, with Justice Minton delivering the majority opinion.
The arrest warrant was issued after a printer disclosed to the
government that Rabinowitz had purchased forged overprint federal
stamps, and also the warrant was based upon the fact that Rabinowitz
had sold forged stamps to a postal inspector. The respondent had been
previously convicted of illegally overprinting federal stamps.3 '
The majority held that the valid arrest under the warrant was
broad enough to cover the crime of possession of illegal goods and
"even if the warrant of arrest were not sufficient to authorize arrest
for possession of stamps, the arrest therefor [sic] was valid because
the officers had probable cause to believe that a felony was being com-
mitted in their very presence. ' ' 4 This comment by the Court was
directed at the fact that the arrest warrant was primarily limited to
the charge of selling four false or altered stamps. This of course leaves
an important issue in the case in a state of suspension: Was the in-
cidental search and seizure made from the arrest warrant or did the
officers have a broader probable cause than stated which allowed them
to make an arrest on a separate charge without a warrant and thus
execute an incidental search and seizure? If the incidental search was
conducted under the authority of the arrest -warrant, this would follow
the Harris case. If, however, the incidental search was conducted
under a fictionalized second arrest, that is, an arrest on reasonable
grounds to believe that Rabinowitz had illegal stamps in his possession-
and thus was committing a crime in the presence of the officers, then
this is the first Supreme Court decision that has ever allowed inci-
dental search at an arrest without a warrant where the officer only
had probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed. The
Agnello decision and all other Supreme Court decisions prior to 1947
had allowed an incidental search only in conjunction with an arrest
38. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
39. Overprinting is the practice of the government of printing the name of a
particular state or possession over a previously printed stamp prior to its gale.
40. 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950).
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for a crime visibly committed in the presence of the officer. The Harris
case expanded these decisions to allow incidental search under an ar-
rest warrant. The present decision appears to be a further expansion
of incidental search.
After the Court had established the power of arrest in the Rabino-
witz decision, it went on to say that an incidental search could be made
upon the person and all within his "immediate control." It determined
that the Harris and Marron cases constituted ample authority for such
a search, noting that the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases had not drained
the Harris and Marron cases of their validity.41 The Court further
stated that the incidental search was reasonable because it was con-
ducted in a business room to which the public, including the officers,
was invited, that the room was small and under the immediate and
complete control of the respondent, and finally that the search did not
extend beyond the room used for the unlawful purposes. The Court
then overruled the Trupiano decision to the extent that it required a
search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring
it rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after the arrest.42
The test of the incidental search then is to be determined by the "rea-
sonableness under all circumstances and not upon the practicability
of procuring a search warrant, for the warrant is not required."4
The majority ended its opinion with the contention that there is suffi-
cient protection from unreasonable incidental searches in the fact that
officers must justify their conduct before the courts.
The following points summarize the weakness of the Court's posi-
tion in the Rabinowitz case:
(i) It departs from the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases in that the
searches in these two cases were of the same essential character and
extent, yet they were held to have been in violation of the fourth
amendment.
(2) If the officers had probable cause to believe that the stamps
were in fact concealed in the office, then this should have been weighed
before a magistrate by applying for a warrant. Probable cause to be-
lieve that goods are illegally hidden in an area that is constitutionally
protected is never a justification for the search of that place without a
warrant.
(3) To say that the test of reasonableness of an incidental search
is the total atmosphere of the case is to leave no test at all unless the
Court establishes some criteria for reasonableness. The Court here
would seemingly abdicate the responsibility of judicially weighing
41. Id. at 62-63.




probable cause before a search and only after the fact of the search
determine the reasonableness. The only result of such abdication will
be that the police concept of reasonableness will become dominant and
controlling. This is true because not all searches will get before the
courts and hence judicial control will never be exercised as it would
have been in the application for a warrant. Secondly, police reasonable-
ness will prevail because the post-mortem examination of the search
tends to give more weight to what the police believe to be probable
cause. While a judge might carefully examine the contentions for
probable cause before the fact of arrest, after the fact a judge-will be
inclined to support executive judgment
(4) The decision lays the groundwork for the complete abandon-
ment of the requirement of a warrant to search. This follows in that
the decision departs from the requirement of necessity as the basis for
every search without a warrant of an area within the protection of
the fourth amendment.
(5) It is an open invitation to police officers to use arrest instead
of a search warrant wherever possible, even though they have the
intention to search for various items in advance of the arrest."
As the law stands today, an incidental search may be made in any
type of arrest, with a warrant, without a warrant for a felony com-
mitted in the presence of the officer, or without a warrant for a felony
which the officer has probable cause to believe has been committed
by the person arrested. On the basis of the Harris and Rabinowitz
decisions what the criteria will be for the determination of the reason-
ableness of the scope in such cases is highly uncertain. The courts will
examine the "total atmosphere" of the case and possibly they will con-
sider the following factors:
(1) The prior probable cause which led the officers to believe that
the objects of seizure were in fact concealed in the place of arrest.
(2) That the objects sought were of a small size and thus not neces-
sarily visible at the time of arrest.
(3) That the place searched was open to the public.
(4) That the place searched was in the legal, immediate and com-
plete control of the prisoner.
However, these factors offer little guide to the law enforcement officer,
since the Court has not indicated how many of these factors must be
present to justify the search.
44. For various comments on the Rabinowitz case see Beisel, Control Over
Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal Law 28 (1955); Machen, Law of Arrest,
76-81 (1950); The Supreme Court, 1949 Term, 64 Harv. L, Rev. 114; 124 (1950);
Notes, 36 Cornell L.Q. 125 (1950), 36 Iowa L. Rev. 142 (1950).
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PRESENT TRENDS [N INCIDENTAL SEARCH
Effect of the Harris and Rabinowitz Decisions.
1. Law Enforcement Practices.
The meaning of the phrase "incidental search" has always been,
prior to the Rabinowitz case, that the search was to be strictly inci-
dental to the arrest and not the primary factor in the arrest. How-
ever, as Justice Frankfurter commented in his dissent in the Rabino-
witz case, the new rule makes "arrest an incident to an unwarranted
search instead of a warrantless search an incident to an arrest."' 5
There are indications that the rule of the Rabinowitz case has not
passed unnoticed by law enforcement agencies. The following cases
will indicate the nature of the problems. In McKnight v. United
States- the defendant was suspected of carrying on a lottery trade
and was trailed as a "pick-up" man repeatedly. Officers secured a
warrant for his arrest but were given orders not to arrest him until he
entered one of the houses he had been seen to enter on previous occa-
sions. The object of such an instruction was to allow an incidental
search of the place of arrest. The arrest was made as instructed and
the officers made an incidental search of the place of arrest. However,
the court declared this incidental search unreasonable and said that
the arrest was a mere pretext for the search. "To call this seizure
incident to this arrest is like saying that cashing a check is incident
to writing it. Mleans are incident to ends, not ends to means."'' 7
A situation similar to the McKnight case occurred in United States
v. Johnson." Here the police secured a warrant for arrest but again
they had specific instructions to wait until the defendant entered his
apartment before executing it. In fact they rejected a convenient
opportunity to arrest him on a public street. The apartment did not
belong to the defendant but he was known to visit it. The police had
some suspicions about the activities of the owner of the apartment,
but they did not have sufficient cause to secure a valid warrant. Clearly
the easiest way to reach the desired area would be to search the apart-
ment by arresting the defendant when he visited it. The Court held
this to be an unreasonable search for the same reasons as given in the
McKnight case.
45. 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950).
46. 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
47. Id. at 979. Cf. United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269 (Alaska 1958),
where the arresting officer stated in court that he arrested defendant in order to
search him. The court upheld the government, holding that such a statement by
the officer had to be taken in the context of the long investigation that the police
had conducted in the case.
48. 113 F. Supp. 359 (D.C.D.C. 1953).
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2. Expansion of Scope: Area in Control of the Prisoner.
A second effect of the Harris and Rabinowitz cases has been a tend-
ency by law enforcement officers to use those cases to justify an in-
crease in the physical area of incidental search. How widespread this
problem may be is presently unknown. Ho wever, there has been a
sufficient number of cases within the eight years after the Rabinowitz
case to warrant the conclusion that the courts are faced with an ever-
increasing problem of whether to limit or allow police invasions of
privacy by means of incidental searches. Until the Supreme Court
gives a clearer indication of the reasonable scope of incidental search,
the lower courts will be subject to pressures from enforcement agen-
cies to allow a wide scope to incidental searches.
In Kernick v. United States49 the defendant was arrested in Union
Station, Kansas City, Missouri, on probable cause to believe that he
was committing a felony in the presence of the officers. The officers
searched his person and found a key to a luggage locker. They went
to the locker in the station and found nothing in it but they continued
their search by using a baggage check found on the person of the de-
fendant. The officers secured nine ounces of heroin from the baggage.
The court held this incidental search within the permissible area since
the suitcase was said to be within the "constructive possession" of the
prisoner."
In United States v. Fowile- the defendant was arrested in his car
some two blocks from his apartment. The officers seized three keys
from the person of the prisoner and then took him with them to his
apartment. The officers used one of the seized keys to open the apart-
ment door, made a search of the apartment and found a key to a
garage in the rear of the apartment. They used this key to open the
locked door of the garage which they searched and from which they
seized contraband heroin. The police justified their conduct as in-
cidental to the arrest. The court, assuming arguendo that the arrest
was valid, ordered the heroin suppressed and a new trial granted as the
search of the apartment and garage were not found to be incidental
to the arrest.
Another example of current tendency of officers to expand the scope
of incidental search is the case of Clifton v. United States.5 2 Here the
court allowed the incidental search of a residence when the arrest took
place in the yard of the residence. The officers purchased illegal liquor
49. 242 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957).
50. See also United States v. Howard, 138 F. Supp. 376 (Md. 1956), where a
warrant was required to search a bartk deposit box upon arrest.
51. 17 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
52, 224 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955).
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from one Padgett in the backyard of Clifton's home and then made a
search of the Clifton home which the officers called incidental to the
arrest. The officers contended that as Padgett was acting on behalf of
Clifton in the illegal activity, they therefore had a right to search the
home. The court did not indicate if there were any limits to the search
of the home but simply stated that Clifton could not insulate his home
from incidental search by the expedient of employing Padgett to make
the sales.53 The court here seems perfectly sound in its contention
that Clifton could not insulate his home from search by employing
Padgett and it also seems obvious from the case that the officers had
probable cause to believe that the home did contain goods subject to
seizure. But the officers should have made application for a search
warrant before invading the home. Belief, however well founded, that
illegal goods are in a place is positively no justification in itself to
search that place without a proper warrant. The Rabinowitz and
Harris cases at least had the merit that the arrest took place in the
home or office and also that the Court directed attention to the extent
of the search within the constitutionally protected afeas."
In 1957, two years after the Fowler and Clifton decisions, a federal
district court in United States v. Jacksons5 allowed an officer to extend
the scope of the incidental search from the car iii which the defendant
was arrested to an apartment some distance from the place of arrest.
The defendant was arrested without a warrant while driving on a city
street. The incidental search produced a key to an apartment which
the officers knew that the defendant had occupied. The court allowed
this search of the apartment, holding that "it has been held that the
search incidental to arrest may be extended beyond the immediate
place of arrest to an adjacent area within the defendant's control
. . ."so and the court cited the Harris and Clifton cases in support
of this position. Of course neither case could support such a position
and the Agnello case is obviously in the opposite direction.
An additional tendency at the present time is to search the entire
premises as incidental to the arrest and justify such on the basis of the
Harris and Rabinowitz decisions. While it is true that before these
decisions by the- Supreme Court the lower courts had allowed the
53. See also Rhodes v. United States, 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1955), where the
court stated that the right of incidental search extends some considerable radius
from the place of arrest.
54. See also Drayton v. United States, 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953), where
officers attempted unsuccessfully to extend their incidental search to various locked
rooms of a rooming house when the arrest took place at the entrance to the resi-
dence.
55. 149 F. Supp. 937 (D.C.D.C. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 250 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
56. 149 F. Supp. 937, 940 (D.C.D.C. 1957).
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search of a whole house as incidental to an otherwise valid arrest, still
the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz decisions of the Supreme Court were aimed
directly at eliminating such a wide area of incidental search. In Smith
v. United States,'5 in an arrest without a warrant on a narcotics
charge, the police were allowed to search as incidental to this arrest
the entire upstairs and ground floor of the house.-' The court cited
in support of this the Harris case. However, the Supreme Court
stressed in the Harris case that the articles being searched for were
small and required a thorough search and additionally that the items
seized were illegally in the possession of the defendant. In the present
Smith case the lower court allowed the seizure of narcotics parapher-
nalia which is not contraband and it is doubtful if it could be called
an instrumentality of a crime when the body of the crime itself was
never produced.
CONCLUSION
In Rhodes t,. United States" the court held that incidental search
extends to some "considerable radius" from the place of arrest; in the
Foiler case the court held that this search extends to the "constructive
possession" of the prisoner; and in the Clifton case the home was in-
vaded yet the arrest took place in the yard of the home. If trends
evidenced by these cases continue, the fourth amendment will quickly
become a historical curiosity in the face of arrest.
Adequate law enforcement in the United States today requires some
degree of incidental search and seizure at the time and place of arrest.
However, the present author has found nothing in the problems con-
fronting law enforcement agencies which demands that they be al-
lowed the increased scope of incidental search which has occurred in
the past eight years. Sooner or later the Supreme Court must squarely
face the issue of whether it is going to allow the fourth amend-
ment to become a third-class right by the simple expedient of using
arrest as a pretext for search. Even where arrest is not an expedient
but made in good faith, the Supreme Court must soon face the problem
of the increasing scope of incidental search. The gradual eating away
of privacy by increasing the scope of incid -ntal search will change the
tense in that famous old phrase in Western civil libertties: "a man's
home is his castle," to "a man's home was his castle." The chief
difficulty in pressing for a reasonable narro-wing of the scope of
search incident to arrest is that, as Justice Douglas has recently
57. 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
58. See also United States v. Games, 258 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1958), as another
of the many examples of this same situation.
59. 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1955).
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stated, "wherever a culprit is caught red-handed, as in the leading
Fourth Amendment cases, it is difficult to adopt and enforce a rule
that would turn him loose. A rule protective of law-abiding citizens
is not apt to flourish where its advocates are usually criminals. Yet
the rule we fashion is for the innocent and the guilty alike." Ol0
60. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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